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LIFE-STAGES IN ETHNOZOOLOGY: A POLYNESIAN EXAMPLE

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It is a familiar enough idea that a language must provide different names for the different developmental stages in the life history of particular animals. The English language offers many instances of juvenile/adult contrasts in animal names: *duck/duckling, cow/calf, sheep/lamb, deer/fawn, dog/puppy, cat/kitten, eel/elver, frog/tadpole, moth/caterpillar, butterfly/chrysalis, bee/grub, fly/maggot, mosquito/wriggler*, and so on. Some of these pairs are more distinctive than others. Some are quite lexically unrelated, while others are clearly derivational. Some are pure "life-stage" expressions such as *fruit* or *the* (where *fruit* is the mature ovary and *the* is the immature ovary).

Anthropologists and linguists have long been aware of comparable expressions in the languages of non-literate peoples. Conklin (1954) and Frake (1961) have described the ethnographic and linguistic significance of life-stage terms encountered on the different habitats inside the life-stage of pests that, despite its possible location of their activities, is still the same pest. Berlin, Breedlove and Raven (1973) have described the ethnobiological significance of life-stage terms encountered in the Tzeltal language of Chiapas, Mexico. Hunn (1977) has described the ethnobiological significance of life-stage terms encountered in the Tzeltal-Tzotzil language of Chiapas, Mexico. Hunn (1977) has described the ethnobiological significance of life-stage terms encountered in the Sahaptin language of Oregon

This leads us to how it is possible to distinguish between a group of similar organisms of differing maximum size and the life-shape of a single organism. There are many possible answers to this. There may be no discontinuities between the groups. The difference between them may be a discontinuity. There may be a possible to observe intermediate forms, indicating a developmental process. For temporary, seasonal variations of a smaller form may suggest that it is juvenile. There may be an obvious overlap in the observed size of the smaller group and the smallest of the larger group. Discontinuities in the observed size of the smaller group available may be satisfactory or inaccessible for other interpretations to be acceptable. In the discussion of the distribution of Mesozoic life-shape sequences I have already outlined some circumstances in which more than one of these possibilities may be applicable to a single sequence.

There are usefully two kinds of useful differentiation associated with life-shape sequences. The first is essentially similar to the kind of useful differentiation seen in taxonomic categories. This is the failure, or lack of success, to distinguish between members of a group. The second kind of useful differentiation is the failure, or lack of success, to distinguish between adults which are merged together in sequences. It is the second variety of useful differentiation which relates to the problem of the identification of

life-stage characters. As in the example of the snails, beetles, and trees with which I discussed the problem of identification, the first kind of useful differentiation is the failure to distinguish between the members of a group, but on the shape. Many life-stage specific useful differentiations illustrate theoretical implications.

One major point is that, even if it can be assumed that all human beings tend to recognize certain basic, inductively learned, life-shape sequences, the identification of these is not a simple matter. Another point is that the most distinctive categories will tend to correspond to the most distinctive sequences. Between classifications that will pass through differences in the one that relationships between such categories are theorized. There is a temptation to assume that the most distinctive categories are the most important. Thus, in the case of the human species, the human (adult) self-consciously be recognized as corresponding to what I have loosely been calling 'life-sequences'. Now life-sequences are abstract sets which may be seen as leading no inference to bias or as having eventually through bias. The life-sequence of the human species, for example, is a sequence of stages which are characteristic of the organism as a whole-grown kind. The typical life-sequence shows important features as widely as the ethnoecological literature are conventionally read as folk organisms. But we have seen that the similarities and differences which is the life-sequence of the human species, for example, is a sequence of stages which are characteristic of the organism as a whole-grown kind. The typical life-sequence shows important features as widely as the ethnoecological literature are conventionally read as folk organisms. But we have seen that the similarities and differences which

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Consideration of life-stages can also lead to questions about the adequacies of our general models of folk classification. Most models of animal classification appear tacitly to assume adult forms as the criterion of classification. For instance, Simon's (1979) 'perceptual' model takes as its starting point "groups of organisms". The clustering of "groups of organisms" is based on "the degree of similarity between pairs of organisms". Such models appear to be based on the notion that the behaviour of animals is determined by the characteristics of adult animals.